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OLIVER V. UNITED STATES: POWELL CHASES KATZ

OUT OF THE FIELDS
INTRODUCTION

Two Kentucky state policemen, without a warrant and admittedly
without probable cause, entered the farm of Ray Edward Oliver after
receiving an anonymous tip claiming that marijuana was growing on his
property.' After driving a short distance past Oliver's house on a road
posted as private, they encountered a locked gate.2 Undaunted, the
detectives parked their car and continued past the gate on foot.3 By this
time, they had already passed four "no trespassing" signs. 4 After the
agents had walked several hundred yards beyond the locked gate, past a
barn and a parked camper, they were warned by a man on the property
not to proceed farther. The police, however, continued their investigation and eventually found a field of marijuana over a mile from the Oliver home. 5 The district court suppressed the evidence obtained by the
officers under the exclusionary rule, 6 but its decision was eventually reversed by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, sitting en banc.7
A similar factual scenario had taken place in Maine. 8 Again, acting
on an anonymous tip, without probable cause or warrant, two police officers proceeded onto private property, between a mobile home belonging to Richard Thornton and a neighboring residence, until they
reached an overgrown footpath in a heavily wooded area. 9 An old stone
wall, a barbed wire fence, and "no trespassing" signs were placed
around the perimeter of Thornton's property, including a sign where
the footpath entered the property. The officers ignored all this, however, and followed the path until they encountered two marijuana
patches 10 which were fenced with chicken wire. Thornton was arrested
1. The Government admitted that it did not have probable cause to conduct the warrantless search. United States v. Oliver, 686 F.2d 356, 362 (6th Cir. 1982) (en banc)
(Keith, J., dissenting), afd, 104 S. Ct. 1735 (1984).
2. Id. at 358.
3. The reported Oliver opinions differ somewhat on the facts of the case. For instance, the Sixth Circuit panel opinion stated that "the two men slipped through a hole in
the gate," United States v. Oliver, 657 F.2d 85, 86 (6th Cir. 1981), rev'den banc, 686 F.2d
356 (6th Cir. 1982). However, the en banc opinion reported that they walked around the
gate and proceeded on a path adjacent to it, 686 F.2d at 358. See Note, Katz in Open Fields,
20 A.,. CPmui. L. Rav. 485, 487 n.13 (1983).
4. Petitioner's Opening Brief at 4, Oliver v. United States, 104 S. Ct. 1735 (1984).
5. Oliver v. United States, 104 S. Ct. 1735, 1738 (1984).
6. See United States v. Oliver, 657 F.2d 85 (6th Cir. 1981) for a synopsis of the
unpublished district court order. The exclusionary rule provides that evidence seized in
violation of the Constitution is inadmissible at the trial of the accused.
7. 686 F.2d 356 (6th Cir. 1982).
8. Maine v. Thornton, 453 A.2d 489 (Me. 1982), rev'd, 104 S. Ct. 1735 (1984).
9. Id. at 490-91.
10. The entire area was so heavily wooded that it was impossible to see the two marijuana patches from Thornton's home, from his driveway, from the public road, or from
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and indicted on the basis of this evidence.II The trial court granted
Thornton's motion to suppress; its decision was affirmed by the Maine
Supreme Judicial Court. 12
In each of these two cases, then, police officers had entered private
property in search of evidence of a crime.1 3 The property owners had
excluded the public with no trespassing signs and fences. The contraband subsequently found by the police was located in areas which could
not have been seen from any vantage point accessible to the public; this
evidence was then used to incriminate the owner of the property. There
was no warrant authorizing the activities of the police in either case.14
In their efforts to incriminate others, the police in both instances
had committed criminal acts themselves, since statutes prohibiting criminal trespass in Kentucky' 5 and in Maine' 6 had been violated. Certiorari
was granted in both cases, 1 7 which were then consolidated.
The United States Supreme Court, in Oliver v. United States,' 8 held
that the fourth amendment, 19 which was created to protect individual
privacy rights against unreasonable governmental intrusion, 20 did not
apply in these two situations. It is argued here that the Oliver decision
conflicts with the "reasonable expectation of privacy" standard enunciated in Katz v. United States, 2 1 that it perpetuates the unworkable curtilage concept, 2 2 and that it inconsistently applies fourth amendment
protections.23
I.

CREATION AND EROSION OF FOURTH AMENDMENT PROTECTIONS

Since the adoption of the fourth amendment, judicial definition of
the amendment's scope has propagated confusion and debate.2 4 To facilitate an understanding of Oliver's impact on fourth amendment analyses, it is necessary to trace the evolution ofjudicial interpretation of the
neighboring land. "In fact, a person would have had to search just to find his way to the
patches." Id. at 491.
11. Oliver, 104 S. Ct. at 1739.
12. 453 A.2d 489 (Me. 1982).
13. Oliver, 104 S. Ct. at 1744 (Marshall, J. dissenting).
14. Id.
15. Ky. REV. STAT. §§ 511.070, 511.080, 511.090 (1985).
16. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17A, § 402(l)(c) (1983).
17. Certiorari was granted in Oliver v. United States, 459 U.S. 1168 (1983) and in
Maine v. Thornton, 460 U.S. 1068 (1983).
18. 104 S. Ct. 1735 (1984).
19. The fourth amendment provides:
The right of people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
20. See infta notes 25-28 and accompanying text.
21. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
22. See infra notes 97-110 and accompanying text.
23. See infra note 125 and accompanying text.
24. See generally Coker, Confusion Regarding Exclusion: The Evolution of the Fourth Amendment, 23 ARIz. L. REV. 801 (1981).
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scope of fourth amendment protection against unreasonable searches
and seizures, as well as the "open fields" exception to the fourth
amendment.
A.

Early History

Prior to the formation of the United States, colonists were frequently subjected to unreasonable searches and seizures under "writs of
assistance." 2 5 These writs were issued by the British, without any requirement of a showing of probable cause, in order for their officers to
search any place suspected of concealing smuggled goods. 26 The widespread abuse of this process by officers has been credited as one of the
major catalysts behind the American movement towards independence. 27 In response to these governmental intrusions on privacy, the
framers of the United States Constitution drafted the fourth amendment
to safeguard fundamental values which would far outlast the specific
28
abuses which gave it birth.
The language of the fourth amendment does not provide a remedy
for its violation. 29 None of the events leading to its adoption involved
pleas that illegally obtained evidence be excluded from trial. In fact, any
pertinent evidence was admissible, regardless of the manner in which it
was obtained; the only remedy available to the victim of illegally ob0
tained evidence was to sue in tort.3
In an effort to put teeth into the fourth amendment protections
against unreasonable searches and seizures, the Supreme Court, in
1886, excluded evidence from a criminal trial due to violation of the
petitioner's constitutional rights in Boyd v. United States.3 1 However, the
25. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 625 (1886). See also H. COMMAGER, Docu104 (8th ed. 1968).
26. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 625.
27. James Otis pronounced the writ to be "the worst instrument of arbitrary power,
the most destructive of English liberty, and the fundamental principles of law, that ever
was found in an English law book," since it placed "the liberty of every man in the hands of
every petty officer." Id. (quoting Cooley's ConstitutionalLimitations, 301-303).
Referring to the famous debate in which the above statement was made, John Adams
reflected that "then and there was the first scene of the first act of opposition to the arbitrary claims of Great Britain. Then and there the child Independence was born." Id.
28. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 8 (1977). In Chadwick, ChiefJustice Burger
reasoned:
[a]ithough the searches and seizures which deeply concerned the colonists, and
which were foremost in the minds of the Framers, were those involving invasions
of the home, it would be a mistake to conclude. . . that the Warrant Clause was
therefore intended to guard only against intrusions into the home. . . . inhere
is no evidence at all that they intended to exclude from protection of the Clause
all searches occurring outside the home.
Id. His discussion indicates that the vagueness in the fourth amendment was intended to
be flexibly construed. See generally N. LAsSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE
MENTS OF AMERICAN HISTORY

FouRTH

AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONsTrrUTON (1937).

29. See, e.g., supra note 19.
30. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 462-63 (1928). For a discussion of modem trends in this direction, see Berner, Fourth Amendment Enforcement Models: Analysis and
Proposal, 17 VAL. U.L. REv. 215 (1982).
31. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
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official creation 3 2 of the exclusionary rule did not take place until 1914,
33
in Weeks v. United States.
In Weeks, the Supreme Court ruled that evidence illegally obtained
34
must be excluded from criminal proceedings in the federal courts.
Thirty-five years later, in Wolf v. Colorado,35 the Court stated that the
exclusionary rule did not apply to state proceedings. However, in 1961,
the Court changed course with its Mapp v. Ohio decision 36 and held that
the exclusionary rule was binding on the states, under the due process
clause of the fourth amendment, as an implicit part of fourth amendment guarantees. 3 7 Mapp was also one of the first cases to espouse deterrence as the principal purpose of the exclusionary rule. 38
B.

The Katz Decision

In 1967, the next major expansion of the fourth amendment's scope
occurred in the landmark decision of Katz v. United States.3 9 Federal
agents in Los Angeles had attached electronic listening and recording
32. The Boyd case is not considered the original source of the exclusionary rule because the decision was not based solely on a violation of the fourth amendment. The
Court reasoned that, as the petitioner was in essence forced to incriminate himself by the
compulsory production of private papers, both the fourth and fifth amendments were violated; the combined violation necessitated exclusion of the evidence. Note, The Erosion of
the Exclusionary Rule Under the Burger Court, 33 BAYLOR L. REv. 363, 363-64 (1981).
33. 232 U.S. 383 (1914). In Weeks, the defendant was convicted, in the trial court, of
usi- the mails to transmit coupons or tickets in a lottery enterprise, based on evidence
obtained by a U.S. Marshall who had searched his room and seized various papers and
articles without a search warrant. The Supreme Court held that such taking of papers by
an official of the United States, acting under color of office, violated the constitutional
rights of the defendant, and that the lower court had erred by permitting introduction of
the papers at trial.
34. Justice Day stated:
[t]he tendency of those who execute the criminal laws of the country to obtain
conviction by means of unlawful seizures. . . should find no sanction in the judgments of the courts which are charged at all times with the support of the Constitution and to which people of all conditions have a right to appeal for the
maintenance of such fundamental rights.
Id. at 398.
In Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), the Court reiterated:
[Iln the Weeks Case, and those which followed, this court decided with great
emphasis and established as the law for thefederal courts that the protection of the
Fourth Amendment would be much impaired, unless it was held that not only was
the official violator of the rights under the amendment subject to action at the suit
of the injured defendant, but also that the evidence thereby obtained could not be
received.
Id. at 463 (emphasis added).
35. 338 U.S. 25 (1949). The Court stated that the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment did not incorporate the Bill of Rights. Id. at 26.
36. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
37. Id. at 655. See also Stewart, The Road to Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond The Origins,
Development and Future of the Exclusionary Rule in Search-and-Seizure Cases, 83 COLUM. L. Rv.
1365 (1983).
38. Coker, supra note 24. "The rationale is that potential exclusion of any evidence
produced by an unreasonable search will eliminate the incentive to conduct such
searches." Id. at 805. See United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976); Peltier v. United
States, 422 U.S. 351 (1975); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974); Elkins v.
United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960). See generally Note, Scope of the Exclusionary Rule--"Inevitable Discovery" Exception Adopted, 4 U. ARK. LrrrLE RocK LJ. 551 (1981).
39. 389 U.S. 397 (1967).
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devices to the outside of a public telephone booth 40 to gather evidence
that Charles Katz was transmitting wagering information to Miami and
Boston in violation of a federal statute. 4 1 The District Court for the
Southern District of California admitted the evidence, and Katz was convicted under an eight-count indictment.4 2 The Ninth Circuit affirmed
the conviction, holding that no fourth amendment violation had occurred, as there was no physical invasion of the area occupied by Katz. 43
The Supreme Court granted Katz's petition for certiorari in order
to provide the lower courts with a much needed clarification of the
fourth amendment's application. The majority opinion shifted emphasis
away from the "constitutionally protected areas" standard 44 toward a
review of reasonable privacy expectations. Most important, the Court
held that the fourth amendment's protections against unreasonable gov45
ernmental intrusions applied to "people, not places."
Justice Harlan, in his concurrence, interpreted the majority opinion
as holding that the rule to be applied was whether the individual had a
"reasonable expectation of privacy."' 46 He then defined this rule as involving a two-part test. First, the individual must have exhibited an expectation of privacy (subjective part). 4 7 Second, this expectation must
40. Id. at 348.
41. 18 U.S.C. § 1084 (1982). The statute provides:
(a) Whoever being engaged in the business of betting or wagering knowingly uses a wire communication facility for the transmission in interstate or foreign commerce of bets or wagers or information assisting in the placing of bets or
wagers on any sporting event or contest, or for the transmission of a wire communication which entitles the recipient to receive money or credit as a result of bets
or wagers, or for information assisting in the placing of bets or wagers, shall be
fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than two years, or both.
(b) Nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent the transmission in
interstate or foreign commerce of information for use in news reporting of sporting events or contests, or for the transmission of information assisting in the placing of bets or wagers on a sporting event or contest from a State where betting on
that sporting event or contest is legal into a State in which such betting is legal.
18 U.S.C. § 1084 (1982).
42. 389 U.S. at 349.
43. Katz, 369 F.2d 130, 134 (9th Cir. 1966).
44. The Court stated that "the correct solution of Fourth Amendment problems is not
necessarily promoted by incantation of the phrase 'constitutionally protected area.' " 389
U.S. at 350. Originally, under a literal interpretation of the fourth amendment, constitutionally protected areas consisted only of "persons, houses, papers and effects." U.S.
CONsT. amend. IV. A "physical trespass theory" was initially used to determine whether
an invasion of a protected area had taken place. Over the years, these protected areas
were expanded to include automobiles, business offices and hotel rooms. Note, Fourth
Amendment Implications of WarrantlessAerial Surveillance, 17 VAL. U.L. REv. 309, 311 n.17, 312
(1983). The physical trespass theory was also expanded, beginning with Silverman v.
United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961), to protect individuals against modem surveillance
devices. After Katz, fourth amendment protection was extended to cover public restrooms
with open stalls, People v. Triggs, 8 Cal. 3d 844 (1973), and garbage, People v. Krivada, 5
Cal. 3d 357 (1971).
45. 389 U.S. at 353. Justice Harlan's concurrence noted: "As the Court's opinion
states, 'the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places.' The question, however, is
what protection it affords to those people. Generally, as here, the answer to that question
requires reference to a 'place.' " Id. at 361.
46. Id.
47. Id.
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be one that society deems reasonable (objective part). 48
The expansive reading of the fourth amendment's protections given
in Katz seemed to impliedly overrule the limitations imposed by the
"open fields" doctrine 49 first espoused almost half a century earlier, in
50
Hester v. United States.
C.

The Open Fields Exception

In Hester, decided in 1924, revenue agents had observed two men
committing the crime of "concealing distilled spirits." 5' The agents had
witnessed the incriminating activity while hiding on private property
without a warrant. However, the case did not mention the presence of
"no trespassing" signs, fences, or anything else which would have indicated that the land was not open to the public; in fact, the Court did not
seem clear as to whether there had even been a trespass. 5 2 The two
men bolted when they saw the officers. While in pursuit, the agents recovered two containers of moonshine whiskey 53 which the men had
abandoned in their flight. The Court held simply that there was no
fourth amendment violation, since the amendment's protections did not
54
apply to "open fields."
Olmstead v. United States, 5 5 decided three years after Hester, involved
evidence obtained through telephone wire taps. The Court again held
that the fourth amendment protections did not apply, since their scope
was limited to "persons, houses, papers, or effects." ' 56 However, the
Court did concede in dicta that an actual physical invasion of the "curtilage" surrounding a house would fall within the amendment's
57
purview.
Therefore, prior to Katz, the open fields doctrine was a recognized
exception to the scope of the fourth amendment. Open fields were not
within the plain meaning of the fourth amendment, and so were not entitled to any constitutional protection. However, the Katz mandate to
48. Id.
49. See Comment, Katz in Open Fields, 20 AM. CrIM. L. REv. 485 (1983).
50. 265 U.S. 57 (1924).
51. Id.
52. Id. at 58. The language used by the Court states ambiguously, "even if there had
been a trespass." Id.
53. The Court defined "moonshine whisky" as "whisky illicitly distilled." Id.
54. The Court matter-of-factly stated that "it is enough to say that.., the special
protection accorded by the Fourth Amendment to the people in their 'persons, houses,
papers and effects,' is not extended to the open fields. The distinction between the latter
and the house is as old as the common law." Id. at 59.
55. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
56. Id. at 465.
57. Specifically, the Court stated:
Neither the cases we have cited nor any of the many federal decisions brought to
our attention hold the Fourth Amendment to have been violated as against a defendant, unless there has been an official search and seizure of his person or such
a seizure of his papers or his tangible material effects or an actual physical invasion of his house "or curti/age" for the purpose of making a seizure.
Id. at 466 (emphasis added).
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protect "people, not places" 5 8 made rigid fourth amendment interpretations, such as those enunciated in Hester and Olmstead, appear
obsolete. 5 9
The open fields doctrine has been the subject of numerous decisions in the lower courts, although there has been a great deal of confusion among the circuits regarding its application, 60 especially after the
Katz decision. 6 1 With its decision in Oliver, unfortunately, the Court has
apparently decided to restrict the expansive reading Katz had previously
given the fourth amendment. Ironically, the Court purportedly uses a
62
Katz analysis to accomplish this end.
II.

OLIVER'S RESTRICTION OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT'S SCOPE

The Oliver decision erodes the scope of the fourth amendment
under the guise of defining protected subject matter.
A.

Analysis of the Majority's Reasoning

The crux of the majority opinion is that fourth amendment protections do not extend to open fields. 63 The majority effectively emasculates the Katz decision, while purporting to apply Harlan's two-part Katz
test in its analysis. As the basis for its revitalization of the "open fields
doctrine," the majority stated that society will never recognize an expectation of privacy in open fields as reasonable. 64 Open fields, then, automatically fail the second, objective, part of Harlan's Katz test. The fact
that a person asserts a subjective privacy interest in the property is
65
irrelevant.
58. Katz, 389 U.S. at 353. "Katz made it clear that the Court would no longer rely
solely on property right technicalities or physical intrusion to determine the scope of protection afforded by the fourth amendment." See Note, How Open Are Open Fields? United
States v. Oliver, 14 TOLEDO L. REV. 133, 142 (1982).

59. See generally Note, Florida v. Brady: Can Katz Survive in Open Fields? 32 Am.U.L.
REv. 921 (1983).
60. See infra notes 97-109 and accompanying text.
61. One recent Supreme Court case did, however, uphold the open fields doctrine, at
least in an administrative context. Pollution Variance Board of Colorado v. Western Alfalfa Corporation, 417 U.S. 861 (1974), was decided seven years after Katz. It involved
open fields surrounding a business, though, and not a home, as in Oliver. Here, a state
health inspector entered the Western Alfalfa Corporation's outdoor premises, without a
warrant, in order to determine if the plant's emissions violated air quality standards. Id. at
862-63. In holding that there was no violation of the fourth amendment, the Court,
although specifically citing Hester, id. at 865, noted that "we are not advised that [the inspector] was on premises from which the public was excluded." Id. The Court was apparently applying the Katz test, finding that there was no subjective manifestation of the
Corporation's privacy interest in the property. The Court implied that if the public had
actually been exduded from the property, it may have ruled differently. Id. Since there
was not even a subjective manifestation of an expectation of privacy in the premises, however, this case failed the Katz test from the outset, unlike the Thornton and Oliver situations.
See supra notes 13-16 and accompanying text.
62. See infra notes 64-85 and accompanying text.
63. Oliver, 104 S. Ct. at 1744.
64. Id. at 1741.
65. Since both parts of Harlan's two-part test must be satisfied in order for a "reasonable expectation of privacy" to be found, the fact that the second part of the test fails
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Justice Powell, writing for the majority, advanced three main reasons that open fields fail the "objective" evaluation under Katz:
fields are not within the plain meaning of the fourth
(1) Open
66
amendment;
(2) Open fields do not provide the setting for those intimate activities that the fourth amendment is intended to shelter from government
interference or surveillance; 6 7 and
(3) A blanket open fields exception to fourth amendment protections would avoid a case-by-case determination of whether a legitimate
expectation of privacy does indeed exist, and would at the same time
68
take the guesswork out of police operations.
1. Plain Meaning Interpretation
The majority stated that open fields cannot be categorized as "persons, houses, papers [or] effects," 69 and therefore are not "within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment." ' 70 Powell tried to reconcile this
strict interpretation with Katz by implying that "persons, houses, papers,
expectations that society is prepared
and effects" are examples of "those
71
to recognize as reasonable."
In explaining its holding, the majority admitted that "no single factor determines whether an individual legitimately may claim under the
fourth amendment that a place should be free of government intrusion
not authorized by warrant." 72 The Court then listed factors it had considered in past determinations of whether society deemed a privacy ex73
pectation to be "legitimate."
2.

No Activities Deserving of Protection

The Court stated that an individual can never have a "legitimate"
expectation of privacy in an open field, as such fields "do not provide
the setting for those intimate activities that the Amendment is intended
to shelter from government interference or surveillance. . . . There is
no societal interest in protecting the privacy of those activities . . . that
precludes the expectation from being found to be a "reasonable" one. See supra notes 4648 and accompanying text.
66. Oliver, 104 S. Ct. at 1740.
67. Id. at 1741. Cf id. at n.10.
68. Id. at 1742-43.
69. This is the precise language used in the fourth amendment. U.S. CONST. amend.
IV., supra note 19.
70. 104 S. Ct. at 1740.
71. Id. (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 361).
72. 104 S. Ct. at 1741 (emphasis added).
73. These factors include:
1. The intention of the framers of the fourth amendment, e.g., United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977);
2. The uses to which the individual has put a location, e.g., Jones v. United States,
362 U.S. 257 (1960); and
3. Our societal understanding that certain areas deserve the most scrupulous protection from government invasion, Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980). Oliver, 104 S.
Ct. at 1741.
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occur in open fields." 74
As support for this proposition, the majority observed that open
fields are usually accessible to the public and the police in ways that a
home, an office, or a commercial building would not be. This is due to
the fact that fences and signs do not generally bar the public from "view75
ing" open fields in rural areas.
3.

Ease of Application

Finally, to bolster its holding that open fields automatically fail the
objective part of the Katz test, the majority stated that such a clear cut
rule would facilitate police enforcement. The Court felt that a blanket
"open fields" exception to fourth amendment protections would make it
easier for a policeman to discern the scope of his authority. 76 It stated
that, conversely, a case-by-case determination would create a danger
77
that constitutional rights could be arbitrarily and inequitably enforced.
B.

White's Concurrence

Justice White briefly stated 78 that the majority's determination that
open fields do not fall within the plain meaning of the fourth amendment provided enough support for its holding. No matter how reasonable an individual's expectations of privacy are, "those expectations
cannot convert a field into a 'house' or an 'effect.' ,,79
C.

The Dissent

Justice Marshall's dissent was joined by Justices Brennan and Stevens. 80 The dissent particularly took issue with the plain meaning interpretation of the fourth amendment taken in both the majority and
concurring opinions, 8 1 and with the majority's finding that society does
82
not recognize a legitimate privacy expectation in open fields.
1.

Non-Literal Interpretation of the Fourth Amendment

Marshall noted the majority's inconsistency with Katz, stating that
"neither a public telephone booth nor a conversation conducted therein
can fairly be described as a person, house, paper, or effect; yet we have
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 1742-43.
77. Id. at 1743.
78. White's concurrence, in its entirety, was as follows:
I concur in the judgment and join Parts I and II of the Court's opinion. These
parts dispose of the issue before us; there is no need to go further and deal with
the expectation of privacy matter. However reasonable a landowner's expectations of privacy may be, those expectations cannot convert a field into a "house"
or an "effect."
Id. at 1744 (White, J., concurring).
79. Id.
80. Id. at 1744-51 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
81. See infra notes 83-86 and accompanying text.
82. See infra notes 87-92 and accompanying text.
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held that the Fourth Amendment forbids the police without a warrant to
eavesdrop on such a conversation." 8 3 Further, Marshall pointed out the
inconsistency in the majority's own holding:
The Court rules that the curtilage, a zone of real property surrounding a dwelling, is entitled to constitutional protection. . . . We are not told, however, whether the curtilage is a
"house" or an "effect"-or why, if the curtilage can be incorporated into the list of things
and spaces shielded by the Amend84
ment, a field cannot.
The dissent reiterated that constitutional provisions should be interpreted to effectuate their purposes.8 5 Marshall stated that the fourth
amendment's guarantee of freedom from unreasonable governmental
intrusions into legitimate expectations of privacy would be incompletely
86
protected if the amendment were strictly construed.
2.

Privacy Expectation Can Be Legitimate

Contrary to the majority's holding, Marshall found that privacy expectations in open fields are sometimes viewed by society as reasonable. 8 7 One way in which society manifests its definition of
reasonableness is in the laws it promulgates. 88 In both Kentucky and
Maine, society protects property interests by invoking criminal sanctions
against those who trespass. 89 A punishable trespass occurs, however,
only when the property owner has manifested his privacy expectation in
the area by posting conspicuous "no trespassing" signs, or by fencing or
otherwise enclosing the area. 90
To further emphasize his point, Marshall listed ways in which privately-owned fields not exposed to public view might be used such that
society would acknowledge a legitimate privacy expectation. 9 1 These
83.

104 S. Ct. at 1745 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (referring generally to Katz, 389 U.S.

347 (1967)).
84. Id.
85. Id. at 1746.
86. Id.
87. Justice Marshall's reasoning was as follows:
[W]e have traditionally looked to a variety of factors in determining whether an
expectation of privacy asserted in a physical space is "reasonable....
Though
those factors do not lend themselves to precise taxonomy, they may be roughly
grouped into three categories. First, we consider whether the expectation at issue is rooted in entitlements defined by positive law. Second, we consider the
nature of the uses to which spaces of the sort in question can be put. Third, we
consider whether the person claiming a privacy interest manifested that interest
to the public in a way that most people would understand and respect. When the
expectations of privacy asserted by petitioner Oliver and respondent Thornton
are examined through these lenses, it becomes clear that those expectations are
entitled to constitutional protection.
Id. at 1747.
88. Justice Marshall stated that "property rights reflect society's explicit recognition
of a person's authority to act as he wishes in certain areas, [and] should be considered in
determining whether an individual's expectations of privacy are reasonable." Id. at 1747
(quoting Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 153 (1978)).
89. See supra notes 15-16.
90. Oliver, 104 S. Ct. at 1748 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
91. Id. at 1748-49.
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include solitary walks, agricultural business, wildlife refuges, lovers'
92
meetings, worshippers' gatherings, or other creative endeavors.
3.

The Dissent's Solution

The dissent concluded by proposing its own rule: "Private land
marked in a fashion sufficient to render entry thereon a criminal trespass
under the law of the states in which the land lies is protected by the
Fourth Amendment's proscription of unreasonable searches and
seizures." 93 Marshall was obviously applying a version of the Katz test:
a subjective privacy expectation, manifested in accordance with the trespass laws of the state, is objectively reasonable. 94
III.

PROBLEMS PERPETUATED BY THE MAJoRrrY's HOLDING

The Oliver majority, while declining to extend fourth amendment
protections to open fields, acknowledged two places obstensibly absent
from the "persons, houses, places, and effects" list as within the fourth
96
95
amendment's coverage: curtilage and offices.
A.

Difficulty of DistinguishingBetween Curtilageand Open Fields

Courts have struggled with the concept of curtilage ever since Olinstead.97 The distinction between curtilage and open fields is extremely
important, as the former is protected under the fourth amendment,
while the latter is not. 98
Curtilage has been generally defined as "an area of domestic use
immediately surrounding a dwelling and usually but not always fenced
in with the dwelling." 99 Oliver defines curtilage as "the area to which
extends the intimate activity associated with the 'sanctity of a man's
home and the privacies of life.' "100 What has been termed a "fairly
well-accepted set of guidelines for ascertaining curtilage" 1'0 is enunciated in Care v. United States :102 "Whether the place searched is within
the curtilage is to be determined from the facts, including its proximity
or annexation to the dwelling, its inclusion within the general enclosure
surrounding the dwelling, and its use and enjoyment as an adjunct to
92. The majority acknowledged these "private uses" suggested by the dissent, but

justified its failure to extend fourth amendment protections in these situations by stating
that "in most instances police will disturb no one when they enter upon open fields." Id. at
1741-42, n.10 (emphasis added).
93. Id. at 1750 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
94. See generally supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text.
95. 104 S.Ct. at 1742.
96. Id. at 1741, n.8.
97. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
98. See gmerally supra notes 51-62 and accompanying text.
99. United States v. LaBerge, 267 F. Supp. 686, 692 (D.Md. 1967).
100. Oliver, 104 S.Ct. at 1742 (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. at 630).
101. United States ex rel. Saiken v. Bensinger, 546 F.2d 1292, 1296 (7th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 431 U.S. 930 (1977).
102. 231 F.2d 22 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 932 (1956).
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the domestic economy of the family."' 0 3
Such a nebulous concept has led to inconsistent results in the appellate courts. 10 4 Outbuildings or areas as far as 240 feet away from a
house have been held to be within the "curtilage,"' 1 5 while others approximately one-third that distance away from a house have been held
to be outside the "curtilage.' 10 6 The Seventh Circuit in United States ex rel.
Saiken v. Bensinger,10 7 frustrated by these inconsistencies, stated its own
per se rule: any outbuilding or area within 75 feet of the house is within
the curtilage and any outbuilding or area further than 75 feet is outside
the curtilage."' 0 8 However, other circuits have declined to follow this
09
rule.'
Oliver provided the Supreme Court with a perfect opportunity to
resolve the curtilage mystery; instead, the Court perpetuated it. Therefore, as the law in this area stands after Oliver, curtilage is protected
under the fourth amendment, while open fields definitely are not. However, a Katz-type analysis" l 0 may be needed to determine whether an
area is actually curtilage or an open field, thus necessitating additional
judgment calls by police officers.
B.

Protection of Offices

Just as the fourth amendment has been held to include "curtilage,"
so it also has been held to cover "commercial premises.""' The
103. Id. at 25.
104. See United States v. Van Dyke, 643 F.2d 992 (4th Cir. 1981) (150 feet is within the
curtilage); United States v. Williams, 581 F.2d 451 (5th Cir. 1978) (150 feet is within the
curtilage), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 972 (1979); United States ex rel. Saiken v. Bensinger, supra
note 101 (400 feet is outside the curtilage); United States v. Minton, 488 F.2d 37 (4th Cir.
1973) (80-90 feet is outside the curtilage), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 936 (1974); United States v.
Capps, 435 F.2d 637 (9th Cir. 1970) (40-45 feet is within the curtilage); Atwell v. United
States, 414 F.2d 136 (5th Cir. 1969) (750 feet is outside the curtilage); Wattenburg v.
United States, 388 F.2d 853 (9th dr. 1968) (20-35 feet is within the curtilage); Fullbright v.
United States, 392 F.2d 432 (10th Cir.) (150-300 feet is outside the curtilage), cert. denied,
393 U.S. 830 (1968); United States v. Mullin, 329 F.2d 295 (4th Cir. 1964) (75 feet is
within the curtilage); United States v. Hassel, 336 F.2d 684 (6th Cir. 1964) (750 feet is
outside the curtilage), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 965 (1965); Brock v. United States, 256 F.2d 55
(5th Cir. 1958) (150-180 feet is outside the curtilage); Hodges v. United States, 243 F.2d
281 (5th Cir. 1957) (150 feet is outside the curtilage); Care v. United States, supra note 102
("one long city block" is outside the curtilage); Walker v. United States, 225 F.2d 447 (5th
Cir. 1955) (210-240 feet is within the curtilage);Janney v. United States, 206 F.2d 601 (4th
Cir. 1953) (100 feet is outside the curtilage). Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924),
the landmark Supreme Court decision in this area, held that an article found 150-300 feet
from the house was outside the curtilage.
105. Walker, 225 F.2d 447 (5th Cir. 1955).
106. United States v. Minton, 488 F.2d 37 (4th Cir. 1973), cert denied, 416 U.S. 936
(1974).
107. 546 F.2d 1242 (7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 930 (1977).
108. Id. at 1297.
109. United States v. Van Dyke, 643 F.2d 992 (4th Cir. 1981).
110. See supra notes 44-48 and accompanying text.
111. Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364 (1968). "This Court has held that the word
'houses,' as it appears in the Amendment, is not to be taken literally, and that the protection of the Amendment may extend to commercial premises." Id. at 367. See also See v.
City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967); Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344
(1931); Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
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Supreme Court has repeatedly indicated that offices can be constitution1 12
ally protected areas.
Katz stated that "what a person knowingly exposes to the public,
even in his own home or office, is not a subject of fourth amendment protection" 11 3 but "what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area
accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected." ' "1 4 The Katz
majority, then, specifically extended its "reasonable expectation of privacy" standard to offices and, in fact, appears to be applying Harlan's
two-part test.
Straying from its own analytical framework, Oliver also evidenced its
support for fourth amendment protection of offices," 5 even though
"offices" are not within the plain meaning of the fourth amendment.
The majority, in dicta, specifically stated that there may be legitimate
expectations of privacy in commercial buildings, citing Marshall v. Barlow's Inc. 1 6 and G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States. 1 7 Both of these postKatz cases employed Harlan's subjective/objective analysis in determining that commercial buildings were protected under the ambit of the
fourth amendment. 1 8
C.

Cumbersome Test

As the law stands after Oliver, certain areas, such as "curtilage" and
"offices," which do not fall within the plain meaning of the fourth
amendment may still be protected by it, depending upon the outcome of
a Katz analysis." 19 Other areas, however, such as "open fields," are held
not to be deserving of a Katz analysis and will never be protected by the
120
fourth amendment, no matter what the surrounding circumstances.
112. The majority opinion in Oliver specifically mentions two recent rulings in which
the Court held that offices fell within the ambit of the fourth amendment: Marshall v.
Barlow's, 436 U.S. 307 (1978) and G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338
(1977). 104 S. Ct. at 1741, n.8. See also Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 211 (1966).
113. 389 U.S. at 351 (emphasis added). In United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311
(1972), the Court held that a business, by its special nature and voluntary existence, may
open itself to intrusions that would not be permissible in a purely private context. Thus, a
warrandess search of a locked storeroom during business hours, pursuant to the inspection procedure authorized by the Gun Control Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. § 923(g), was upheld since "[w]hen a dealer chooses to engage in this pervasively regulated business and to
accept a federal license, he does so with the knowledge that his business records, firearms,
and ammunition will be subject to effective inspection." Id. at 316. In Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970), the Court stated that Coneress has
broad authority to fashion standards of reasonableness for searches and seizures to regulate the liquor industry, although in that case a warrantless search was not authorized. See
also Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206 (1966); United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559 (1927).
114. 389 U.S. at 351. See Rios v. United States, 364 U.S. 253 (1960); ExparteJackson,
96 U.S. 727 (1877).
115. Oliver, 104 S. Ct. at 1741, n.8.
116. 436 U.S. 307 (1978).
117. 429 U.S. 338 (1977).
118. Oliver, 104 S. Ct. at 1741, n.8. Justice Powell refers to Marshall v. Barlow's and G.
M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, supra note 112.
119. See supra notes 110-115 and accompanying text.
120. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
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Therefore, after Oliver, policemen actually have a more cumbersome test
to apply.
First, officers must determine whether the area in question is an
"open field," thus falling under a blanket exclusion from fourth amendment protections. In order to do this, however, the police must determine if the area can be classified as curtilage. Such a determination has
not proven easy in the past.' 2 1 Second, if the area does not fall under a
blanket exclusion from fourth amendment protections, the officers must
proceed to a Katz analysis to determine whether the individual had a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the area. 122 If not, there are no
fourth amendment protections. If so, fourth amendment protections
apply. 123
Oliver, in its attempt to streamline the analytical process for police124
men, actually adds the extra, "first," step to that process.
IV.

PROPOSAL

The majority opinion in Oliver results in a selective and inconsistent
application of the Katz analysis. Open fields, when involving private
land where citizens have made their homes, should at least be accorded
the same protections as businesses.' 2 5 Furthermore, confusion as to
what constitutes curtilage necessitates the case-by-case determination
26
process which the Oliver majority wished to avoid.'
Hester does not need to be overruled, but it should only be used as
modified by the Katz decision. 127 As in the office exception,1 28 Harlan's
subjective/objective clarification of the reasonable expectation of privacy standard should still be used. Specifically, the test to be applied to
open fields should be that which was basically proposed by the Oliver
29
dissent: 1
121. See supra notes 97-109 and accompanying text.
122. For example, such a determination would be necessary in the case of a telephone
booth, see Katz, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), or an office, see supra notes 109-118 and accompanying text.
123. See supra notes 44-48 and accompanying text.
124. This "first" step, as previously stated, is that officers must now determine whether
an area falls under a blanket exclusion from fourth amendment protections. This must be
done before the officers apply the Katz analysis, since if the area is excluded under the first
test, no additional analysis is necessary. However, a Katz analysis may be needed to determine whether the first test is satisfied, see supra note 110 and accompanying text.
125. See supra notes 111-118 and accompanying text.
126. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
127. "It now appears that Hester no longer has any independent meaning but merely
indicates that open fields are not areas in which one traditionally might reasonably expect
privacy." United States v. Freie, 545 F.2d 1217, 1223 (9th Cir. 1976). See also United
States v. Magana, 512 F.2d 1169, 1170 (9th Cir. 1974); Patler v. Slayton, 503 F.2d 472,
478 (4th Cir. 1974).
128. See supra notes 111-118 and accompanying text.
129. The test proposed by the dissent, see supra notes 93-94 and accompanying text,
basically qualified the Katz test in both parts ofJustice Harlan's subjective/objective analysis:
(1) An individual must manifest his individual expectation of privacy in an open field
by complying with the "markings" required under his state's criminal trespass statute.
(2) Society will objectively view a governmental intrusion as a violation of the indi-
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(1) The manifestation of a subjective expectation of privacy,
(2) Evaluated objectively by societal standards of reasonableness.
Considerations for the first part of the above test might include
whether the area in question could be viewed from a place open to the
public, and whether the individual asserting the privacy expectation had
posted signs, erected fences, or otherwise indicated that the place was
private.
Considerations for the second part of the above test might include
whether the individual manifesting the privacy expectation had complied with the notice requirements under local trespass laws, whether in
fact there were any trespass laws, and whether the open field was next to
30
a residence.
Application of the two-part Katz test to open fields questions would
abolish the nebulous curtilage concept. In addition, it would provide a
consistent standard for law enforcement officers to apply, instead of a
rule fraught with exceptions.
CONCLUSION

The Oliver decision, under the guise of streamlining fourth amendment application, only serves to perpetuate old problems, as well as create new ones. Determination of whether an intrusion into an open field
constitutes an unreasonable search should depend, per Katz,' 3 ' on a
reasonable expectation of privacy standard. This can be evaluated by
viewing an individual's subjective expectation of privacy, as manifested,
in light of objective societal standards.' 3 2
Leslie Ranniger

vidual's fourth amendment rights only if said intrusion constituted a trespass under the
laws of that state.
This author agrees with the dissent's proposal as far as it goes, but feels it is too
limited; Katz would have allowed the consideration of other factors in addition to those
listed above.
130. Even though a subjective privacy expectation is expressed, society would probably
not deem the expectation to be objectively reasonable where there is no dwelling at all on
the land. See United States v. Freie, 545 F.2d 1217 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v. Pruitt,
464 F.2d 494 (9th Cir. 1972); United States v. Capps, 435 F.2d 637 (9th Cir. 1970).
131. In particular, as previously discussed, the analysis should focus on whether there
is a reasonable expectation of privacy, as determined by the use of Justice Harlan's twoprong subjective/objective analysis. Katz, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967).
132. See supra notes 127-130 and accompanying text.

